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THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER DOCTRINE
BY KARL D. LYON
Like so many judicial utterances that aptly and
dramatically express a thought, the phrase'clear and
present danger' has become a bon mot, used over and over
by judges and the public alike. Inartificially, the
idea that freedom of speech must not be curbed unless
a clear and present danger so demands has been hailed
as a basic American constitutional doctrine. But to
find out how it is actually useful as a legal principle
in deciding a case, we go to the United States Supreme
Court decisions which either quote the words or cite the
case from where it stems. And here we discover that
nearly all these cases contain dissenting opinions, that
in many the citation is found in the dissent, and that
in a goodly number both the majority and the minority
either referred to or based themselves on the doctrine!
Faced with so much conflict and uncertainty, we should
reappraise the doctrine and try to discern its present
limits of application.
The phrase was first enunciated by Oliver Wendell
Holmes on March 3, 1919, in his opinion for a unanimous
court in Schenck v. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, when he wrote,
speaking of the power of the Government to limit the
freedom of expression by an individual: "The question
in each case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree."
This phrase has become a determinant wherever
the protection of the First Amendment of the Federal
Constitution is claimed. The Amendment in unqualified
terms prohibits Congress from making any law i.e. pro-
hibiting the free exercise of religion, abridging free-
dom of speech and press or the right of peacable as-
sembly. An "abridgment" can occur by a previous re-
straint on speech, as well as by the threat of subsequen
punishment for what was said. Thus the Bill of Rights
extended the old Blackstonian doctrine that a "freeman
has the undoubted right to lay what sentiments he has
before the public, but if he publishes what is improper,
mischievous, and illegal, he must take the consequences
of his own temerity." The lack of qualification did
broaden the idea of freedom of utterance in America.
But on the other hand, the right has never been an ab-
solute one, nor has it been unconditionally protected
from prior restraint. The operation of some e-ommon law
rules and the exercise of important Federai and State
powers in some respect and to some degree invade the
individual's right to express his thoughts at will.
Like all human activities, those protected by the First
Amendment must be weighted according to their impres-
sion and effect on relations between people, and at
times may be subordinated for the good of all. The
rule laid down by Holmes provided a possible test for
the extent of permissible deprivation of these rights.
The setting in which the doctrine was announced
was a prosecution under the 1917 Espionage Act for
conspiracy to influence persons -subject to the Draft
Act to obstruct the draft. Defendant had circulated
literature asking the draftees to disobey the draft.
The Act was held not violative of the First Amendment,
and sustainable under the war power, as it was time
freedom of speech - which is not absolute - could be
restrained in the interest of the National safety.
The decision could have tested on this alone, but
Holmes went further to announce the proposition that
there must be a clear danger and a present danger of
the substantive evil being brought about by the words
spoken before the Government can exercise its power to
proscribe and punish. As this test was "not absolute-
ly necessary to the decision of this-case (which ap-
parently fell within the limits set by the test), we
may suppose that the remark was simply "magnificent
dictum." Thus the question of raising this phrase to
the dignity of a test of constitutionality is left to
later cases.
Two important questions arise on a reading of
the Schenck case. Holmes spoke of "circumstances"
in which words would become culpable. What such cir-
cumstances could be, has been a major source of con-
tention. They vary in degree with each of the types
of situations to which the Schenck test has been ap-
plied. The other problem is whether the doctrine
actually sets absolute limits either to permissible
deprivation or to permissible speech, or whether it
is only an approximate description of the areas free
from Governmental control. A review of the major
United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the doc-
trine is here necessary.
The first few cases reiterating the doctrine
arose under the same law, the Espionage Act, and on
similar facts. In Frohwerk v. U.S., 249 U.S. 206, the
defendant published literature denouncing the war ef-
fort, and in Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211, the defendant
made speeches declaring himself opposed to all war, in-
cluding the present one, and urged opposition to re-
cruiting. Holmes, speaking for the court in both cases,
disposed of them on the basis of the Schenck decision,
handed down only seven days earlier. A visible change
occured by November of that year, when the opinion in
Abrams v. U.S., 40 S. Ct. 17, was announced. Here con-
viction was had under the same Act and on similar
grounds. The majority held the Schenck test applicable
in affirming the conviction. Justices Holmes and Bran-
deis dissented on their view of the facts, although they
reasserted the Schenck doctrine. They held that the in-
tent of the defendant here was to prevent interference
with the Russian revolution, thus was not necessarily
obstructive to the war in which the United States was
engaged, and consequently would not produce present
danger of the substantive evil punished by the statute.
In the Abrams dissent, Holmes developed the basis
for his doctrine further: "When men have realized that
time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is
better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best
test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that
truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely
can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of
our Constitution. "
The case of Schaeffer v. U.S., 40 S. CT. 259,
showed a clearer break with the majority of the court.
Here a conviction under the Espionage Act for publish-
ing false reports and editorials to promote the success
of the enemies of the United States was upheld. Again
the dissent disagreed on the inferences from the facts.
Brandeis maintained that though the U.S. had a right to
punish in a proper case, under the "rule of reason" of
the Schenck case, no jury could here have found that the
publication "would obstruct recruiting" or "would promote
the success of the enemies," and thus there would be no
present danger. The same division of the court decided
Pierce v. U.S. 40 S. Ct. 205, where distribution of pam-
phlets to cause insubordination and disloyalty in the
armed forces was held punishable under the Espionage
Act. The majority held that it was a question for the
jury, whether defendant's printed words would as a proxi-
nate result produce material interference with the armed
forces. But again Brandeis maintained that there was no
present danger, as the purpose of the pamphlets was only
to gain members for the Socialist party, and as they
were not distributed to any members of the armed forces.
If both the majority of the court and the dissents
in the above cases relied on the Schenck doctrine, how
were the different conclusions possible? The confusion
stems from the fact that the doctrine was in effect a
mere dictum in the Schenck case. That in reality it was
not there relied on, nor in the next two cases, is evi-
dent from the opinions of Holmes in the three cases.
They do not discuss in detail the circumstances in which
the prohibited words were uttered, nor whether the words
under those circumstances created a substantial and im-
mediate probability of the evil to be prevented. The
overpowering shadow of the war then in progress seems to
have satisfied the test of "proximity and degree." These
decisions were handed down shortly after the firing
ceased. But the interval of one year after the Armistice
may have produced a reexamination of their position by
Holmes and Brandeis, and a determination that an inquiry
into the special facts of each case should henceforth be
had to show whether the deprivation of freedom of speech
was so vitally necessary that the case should be upheld.
The majority, on the other hand, continued to make the
existence of the state of war, thus of "circumstances"
in a larger sense, the basis for the application of the
restrictive statute. Thus though they professed to fol-
low the Schenck doctrine, it was not strictly applied
in its literal meaning. In analysing the later cases
we must inquire into which meaning was given to it.
We can here pause to consider what might have
been the intention of Justice Holmes as to the scope of
the doctrine. Certainly, if we accept the doctrine as
actually applied in the Schenck case, it does not pre-
sent an exclusive limit of permissible deprivation.
In that case the actual proximity of the act to the
possible result or the degree of effect on such possible
result was not looked into, and the conviction was sus-
tained on the ground that "when a nation is at war,
many things that might be said in time of peace are
such a hindrance to its efforts . . . that no court
could regard them as protected by any Constitutional
right." Thus the "clear and present danger" may not
be the exclusive limit to Governmental restriction of
speech, which in time of National emergency may thus be
further restricted. But Holmes's and B randeis's later
position in their dissents reveal that the real meaning
was the literal meaning of the phrase. This suggests
that even though a state of war existed and the Govern-
ment was constitutionally authorized to protect its
military operations, it is still a primary question of
fact whether the speech of the defendant was remote or
proximate, or substantial or inconsequential, in tend-
ing to produce the result to be avoided. Under this
interpretation, the "clear and present danger" rule
may have been intended as a real measure of protection
of the right of free speech, and as a limit beyond
which it could not be infringed on by Governmental
action. Of course, this meaning was only presented in
dissenting opinions, and whether the court would make
it its own was left to later cases.
The preceding cases have dealt only with Federal
statutes and the question of their applicability to
the defendant. The next case before the high court
involving the doctrine, Gilbert v. Minnesota, 41 S. Ct.
125, indicated an extension of the test into two new
areas, the acts of states and defenses to status per
se. Here a state status punishing the uttering of
words in a public meeting to discourage enlistments
in the armed forces and a conviction under it were
upheld. Though the Schenck case was cited, the deci-
sion was on the basis of the state's police power to
preserve the peace and its interest in a national war.
Brandeis, dissenting, denied that the police power of
the state, exercised in peace and war, could curb
freedom of speech to an extent only reserved to Con-
gress in time of war, the war power justifying the
restriction in averting present danger in war time.
He considered the guaranties of the First Amendment
to be privileges of national citizenship, which could
not be abridged by the states. But Holmes concurred
in the result. His reason for this may be found by
pointing to his opinion in Fox v. Washington, 236
U.S. 273, (1915), upholding a state statute outlawing
the willful publishing of any incitement to the commis-
sion of any crime. He held that act to be a justifiable
deprivation of liberty consistent with due process. The
state here had reasonably drawn the line of permissible
behavior short of the encouragement of manifest dis-
respect for law, i.e. overt breaches and technically cri-
minal acts. Thus Holmes insisted on a narrow construc-
tion of the statute, and as such upheld it. But here
only the 14th Amendment was the basis for objection, and
at that time the positive prohibitions of the First
Amendment were not thought to be implied in the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the 14th. Not until the Gitlow case, 45
S. Ct. 625, was the Bill of Rights interpreted as a mea-
sure of "due process". and thus as an inhibition on state
action.
Gitlow v. New York also upheld a state law pro-
hibiting certain utterances entirely. Here the New York
Criminal Anarchy Act was sustained on the state's right
to preserve itself, unqualifiedly held to be superior
to freedom of speech. The majority distinguished the
Schenck case by differentiating statutes proscribing
speech per se and statutes prohibiting certain acts
tending to bring about a substantive evil. They said
the Schenck doctrine was intended to apply only in the
second type of cases, where the "acts" consist of speech.
There an original showing must be made in each case that
the speech is in fact dangerous, while in the former
type the tendency to produce the evil is immaterial. The
only showing here would be that the words actually fall
within the forbidden area of speech.- If so, they were
punishable, as long as the state had the power to pass
such a statute. This distinction was vigorously at-
tacked by Holmes and Brandeis as fatuous and unwarranted
by the positive language of the First Amendment, which
the majority had implied to be applicable in determining
the scope of the Due Process Clause. The "danger" test
should be an original question in each case where utter-
ances are held culpable. But Holmes' misapprehension in
his dissent was his expressed assumption that the law
had been settled on that point, when in fact the majori-
ty of the court, as pointed out above, refused to inter-
pret his doctrine at face value. His view of the test
was not adopted by the court until 1937.
No further light was shed on the doctrine by
Whitney v. California, 47 S. Ct. 641, where the court
held the California Criminal Syndicalism Act well within
the decision of the Gitlow case. Holmes and Brandeis
reiterated that though a statute may be constitutional
per se, it may still be challenged as invalidly applied,
But they concurred in the result, because they found
evidence of a conspiracy, and the defendant did not
claim invalidity of application under the circumstances.
The Schenck case was next cited in Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, for the proposition that the imposition
of previous restraint on speech was not absolutely for-
bidden, but is allowable in exceptional cases, such as
in war time. However, the test was not a feature of
that case, which overthrew a statute prohibiting scan-
dalous publications on the ground that its necessary
effect was to impose censorship on criticism of public
officers. The case held freedom of the press to be
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.
If the doctrine was ever to become a test of
constitutionality, its limits and operation could not
be discerned until a conviction was actually held un-
constitutional by the Supreme Court on those grounds.
This occurred in Herndon v. Lowry, 57 S. Ct. 738,
(1937), where the prophet finally came into his own
two years after his death. Though by a narrow margin
of one vote, the court held the Georgia Anti-Insur-
rection Statute (penalizing any attempt by persua-
sion or otherwise to induce others to join in any com-
bined resistance to lawful authority of the state)
inapplicable to a case where the defendant solicited
memberships for the Communist Party. Mr. Justice
Roberts here applied the Schenck test in its literal
meaning, saying that there is no such proximity be-
tween an insurrection and the mere procurement of
members to a party, some of the tenets of which may
be"lawful, others, as may be assumed, unlawful" by
"ultimate resort to violence at some indefinite fu-
ture time." The decision then also held the statute
invalid on its face for furnishing too indefinite a
standard for guilt.
This opinion is notable for two propositions,
which may now be considered corollaries of the
Schenck doctrine as applied here. It indicated some
requirements for the constitutionality of a statute
effecting a right guaranteed by the First Amendment.
For example, statute to curb speech willfully inter-
fering, proximately and substantially, with a vital
and well defined governmental activity, or speech
having a "dangerous tendency" to subvert the government,
have been upheld. Such statutes had to describe and de-
fine the proscribed utterance'carefully and adequately
and require a narrow intent directed against the vital
object to be protected. Such intent may be inferred
from time, place, and circumstances.
The second proposition was the holding that "the
power of the state to abridge freedom of speech and of
assembly is the exception rather than the rule. The
limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate
relation to the safety of the state." This pronounce-
ment is important, as it limits the rule which had been
followed up to the time of the Gitlow and Whitney cases.
The opinion in the former case declared: "Every pre-
sumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of
the statute." This doctrine is the usual presumption
in deciding whether a statute is a reasonable means of
achieving its lawful purpose, upon an attack under the
Due Process Clause. But it was only logical that the
court should adopt this exception to the presumption,
when it required more than mere "reasonableness" in
upholding statutes affecting freedom of speech. To the
effect that this was in consonance with Holmes' view
and to show the theoretical basis for the new rule, a
passage of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in
Kovacs v. Cooper, 69 S. Ct., 448, is enlightening:
"The ideas now governing the constitutional protection of
freedom of speech derive essentially from the opinions of
Mr. Justice Holmes. The philosophy of his opinions on
that subject arose from a deep awareness of the extent
to which sociological conclusions are conditioned on time
and circumstances. Because of this awareness, Mr. Justice
Holmes seldom felt justified in opposing his own opinion
to economic views which the legislature embodied in law.
But since he also realized that the progress of civili-
zation is to a considerable extent the displacement of
error which once held sway as official truths by beliefs
which in turn have yielded to other beliefs, for him the
right to search for truth was of a different order than
some transient economic dogma. And without freedom of
expression, thought becomes checked and atrophied. There-
fore, in considering what interests are so fundamental
as to be enshrined in the Due Process Clause, those
liberties of the individual which.history has attested
as the indispensable condition of an open as against a
closed.society come to this Court with a momentum for
respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which
derive merely from shifting economic arrangements. Accord-
ingly, Mr. Justice Holmes was far more ready to find legisla-
tive invasion where free inquiry was involved than in the
debatable area of economics."
With the Lowry case then, the "clear and present
danger" doctrine had "arrived" as the rule of the Su-
preme Court. Its application was, according to its
literal meaning rather than its early application. But
the majority so holding was narrow, and the issue of its
application was not laid at rest. In fact, the court
has, since 1937, split more bitterly than before. In
the cases following, we shall not concern ourselves so
much with the types of cases to which the rule is rele-
vant (i.e. what would actually constitute a "substan-
tive evil) ", but rather, how far the Court has gone in
applying the rule. Has it been extended or restricted?
The suggestion in the Lowry case as to narrowness
in drafting and construction of statutes affecting
freedom or speech was followed-in Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88, and Carlson v. California, 60 S. Ct. 746,
in which the Schenck doctrine was applied in cases of
industrial disputes. The decisions declared a statute
prohibiting going near a place of business to induce
others not to deal with such business, and a statute
prohibiting the carrying of signes in picketing, uncon-
stitutional as an unwarranted restriction of the liber-
ty of discussion of public issues. The statutes were
too sweeping in scope, and thus void on their face,
"under circumstances presenting no clear and present
danger of substantive evil within the allowable area
of state control." Thus where a statute is so drawn as
to cover a multitude of situations which would fall
outside the "clear and present danger" area, the court
now committed itself to the invalidation of the entire
statute. But what would the holding be as to the vali-
dity of such a statute, where the facts of the case be-
fore the court would satisfy the "clear and present
danger" test?
On this point, a clue was given in Milk Wagon
drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc.-, 61 S. Ct.
552, in which an injunction of picketing was upheld
in its entirety, where the strike was set against a
background of violence. Here the right to picket as
a right of free speech was in effect limited to peace-
ful picketing. But the majority did not mention the
Schenck test, and the minority disagreed in its inter-
pretation of the facts, finding no clear and present
danger of continued violence to warrant an entire pros.-
cription of picketing as such. Thus, though limiting
the effect of the Thornhill case as to picketing, this
case does not clarify further the extent of the Schenck
doctrine.
The cases of Pennekamp v. Florida, 66 S. Ct. 1029,
and Craig v. Harney, 67 S. Ct. 1249, must be considered
together with Bridges v. California, 62 S. Ct. 190.
They were all contempt citations issued by state courts
for publishing comments on cases then pending in court.
Defendants were a labor leader, who stated in a tele-
gram that a certain decision would result in a strike,
and newspaper publishers, who printed editorials im-
puting partisanship to the judge, calling for high sen-
tences for convicted defendants, belittling the judge,
and commenting unfavorably on the judge's disposition
of cases. The Bridges case first introduced the Schenck
test into this type of case, displacing the earlier rule
that a "reasonable tendency" must be shown that the
words used would interfere with the orderly administra-
tion of justice. Mr. Justice Black spoke of the Schenck
test as a rule affording "practical guidance." Then, by
this test, the words published were held to be not a
substantial threat to administration of justice by in-
timidation of the judge, upon the preconception- that a
"a lack of firmness, wisdom or honor" must not be im-
puted to the judge. But what circumstances would act-
ually present a clear and present danger to warrant
contempt for comment made outside the courtroom was not
indicated, except that the opinion in the Craig case
called for an appraisal of the words in the setting of
the news articles both preceding and following it and
in the light of community environment prevailing at the
time. But it stated that "the law of contempt is not
made for the protection of judges sensitive to winds of
public opinion," and thus in effect creates a deterrent,
if not a material restriction, to the use of the con-
tempt power. The conflict in the court as to the
Schenck test generally is indicated by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's attack on its use here, in his dissent
in the Craig case: "The opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes
contain not the remotest hint that the Due Process
Clause withdrew from the states the power to base a
finding of contempt on publication aimed at a particu-
lar outcome of a matter awaiting adjudication . . ..
(thus the doctrine would become) merely a phrase for
covering up a novel, iron constitutional doctrine."
Strictly, however, the difference in opinion rests on
divergent views of the facts, although a deeper con-
flict as to the limits of the doctrine is expressed,
which will be dealt with.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 62 S. Ct. 766, though
not directly citing the Schenck doctrine, serves to il-
lustrate, in the words of Mr. Justice Murphy, that al-
lowing the broadest scope to the First Amendment, "there
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never
been thought to raise any constitutional problem." In-
cluded here are lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, and
"insulting" or "fighting" words - those which by mere
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace. Their social value is so slight as
a step to truth as to be outweighed by the value of or-
der and morality. These types of restrictions, it may
be noted, are not inconsistent with the Schenck doctrine
nor do they extend its limits of permissible proscrip-
tion of speech. These classes of speech have al-ways
been considered such immediate inroads on elementary in-
terests of decency, morality, and peacefulness to be sub-
ject to prohibition. Put there is emphasis on "narrow-
ness" of these classes of speech, and the necessity for
drafting the statute accordingly.
In line with the Court's application of the Schenck
doctrine since the Lowry case, it restated the require-
ments for conviction under the Espionage Act of 1917 in
the decision of Hartzel v. U.S., 64 S. Ct. 1233. It ap-
plied a subjective test and an objective test: 1) a nar-
row specific intent, which is provable from the words
used and the circumstances; 2) activities creating a
clear and present danger of bringing about the evil. Then
the court inquired into the circumstances of this particu
lar case, deciding that there was a reasonable doubt of
the defendant's specific intent to cause insubordination
in the armed forces. However, the dissent found such
criminal intent.
The literal application of the Schenck doctrine was
adhered to in Thomas v. Collins, 65 S. Ct. 315, where a
State law requiring registration of persons soliciting
members for labor unions was held inapplicable. A labor
leader here made a speech, in which he extended a general
invitation to join and also a specific invitation to
one person. Though the statute Was defended as a legi-
timate licensing requirement of a profession, the court
found that under the Schenck test that defense could
not be applied here. Mr. Justice Rutledge held that law-
ful assemblies, involving no grave and immediate danger,
are not instruments of harm, thus requiring no previous
identification of speakers. This is in accord with
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, holding that the right
of assembly cannot itself be made a crime.
That the "clear and present danger" test is appli-
cable to protect freedom of religion was held in West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 03 S. Ct.
1178, where a compulsory flag salute for school children,
carrying penalties for disobedience, was overturned as
violative of the 14th Amendment. Mr. Justice Murphy here
said that, where the flag salute is regarded as contrary
to a religious obligation, it is a restriction on reli-
gious freedom, which includes "the right to speak and to
refrain from speaking.-" Mr. Justice Jackson reiterated
the doctrine: "Freedom of speech and religion may not
be infringed upon such slender grounds" (i.e. simply a
"rational basis" for regulation, which usually satisfies
due process). "They are susceptible to restriction only
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which
the state may lawfully protect." Thus the literal basis
of the Schenck doctrine was affirmed. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter again dissented strongly on theory, but disagreed
on the merits, because he could not see any suppression
of or curb on any belief. On the ground of the Barnette
case, the court held a conviction for teaching or dis-
semination of literature "reasonably tending to create
an attitude of stubborn refusal to salute, honor, or
respect the national and state flags" void. Thus the
state law punishing the teaching of disloyalty to the
national and state governments was inapplicable. Taylor
v. Mississippi, 63 S. Ct. 1200.
The converse right to propagate one's religious
beliefs was held in Martin v. City of Struthers, 63 S.
Ct. 862, to have a higher dignity than municipal or
personal convenience. Here an ordinance completely
prohibited distribution of handbills to residences. As
the First Amendment has been held to include the right
to circulate literature (Lowell v. Griffin, 303 U.S.
444), an absolute prohibition of such circulation to
residences ill a city was held to transgress the permis-
sible bounds of "regulation" of such circulation in the
interest of public order. This ruling was carried fur-
ther in Marsh v. Alabama, 66 S. Ct. 276, to apply to a
company town, where religious preaching had been forbid-
den. Mr. Justice Reed, dissenting in both cases, thought
the restriction to be merely a permissible regulation un-
der the police power, not materially invading the area of
free speech. Whether this rule would be carried to the
extent that one may now remain on private property again-
st the will of the owner, so long as the only objection
to his remaining there is his right to spread his reli-
gious views, (as feared by Reed) is doubtful. Although
both majority and dissent are phrased in general terms,
there may in fact have been some degree of dedication to
public use in the streets of a company town, and thus the
application of the case could be limited to public or
quasi-public places. It is certainly not applicable to a
private dwelling.
These cases concerned the validity of the applica-
tion of a law in a particular case. Taking the Schenck
test as a point of departure, the Court has invalidated
statutes going so clearly beyond the bounds of any clear
and present danger of substantive evil that their neces-
sary operation would involve prior restraints on speech
in practice, even though the Court later could hold the
statute inapplicable to a particular situation. Such a
clear case was Thornhill v. Alabama. But the last two
cases considered were not so clear, and in Kovacs v.
Cooper-, 69 S. Ct. 448, a boundary line was approached -
and crossed. The schism is indicated by the fact that
the division in the Court was five to four, that five
opinions were written, and that no more than three Jus-
tices joined in any one opinion. Here a conviction under
a municipal ordinan.ce prohibiting the use of sound trucks
or other instruments "making loud and raucous noises" was
upheld, as a re-asonable exercise of police power. The
use of such devices was thought to involve limitation on
speech only incidentally. Mr. Justice Reed said that
such exercise of free speech may be "controlled" in the
interest of public order, and that even an absolute pro-
hibition in a limited area (city) was proper control. Mr.
Justice Black, dissenting, maintained that "there is no
more reason for wholly prohibiting one useful instrument
of communication than another," although the use of such
instruments could be reasonably controlled. The minority
protested that the conviction was not for making "noises"
but for operating a sound truck, without any finding as t
"noises", and thus.completely inhibited one means of ex-
pressing opinion. This opinion came at the heels of Saia
v. New York, 68 S. Ct. 1148, where a prohibition of sound
trucks except with a permit of the police chief was in-
validated as a previous restraint on speech!
The lint drawn, where validity of statutes per se
is in issue, is thus much more vaccilating than where the
applicability of statutes to particular cases is to be
decided. The question posed after our consideration of
the Lowry case received one possible answer in Terminiel-
lo v. Chicago, 69 S. Ct. 894. The defendant had made an
inflammatory speech in a situation where the tension be-
tween his listeners and an unfriendly crowd had reached
proportions of a riot. He was convicted of disorderly
conduct, which an ordinance defined as "making, aiding
a breach of the peace . . . " Breach of the peace was de-
fined in the court's charge as behavior which "stirs the
public to anger, invites disputes, brings about a condi-
tion of unrest, or creates a disturbance.-" Mr. Justice
Douglas held that the acceptance of this definition by the
state Supreme Court made it part of the ordinance. He
said the exercise of free speech in a free society may
legitimately have the results of the first three parts of
the definition, and an inhibition of such exercise makes
the ordinance void in part. As the charge to the jury
did not permit severance of the void parts from the valid
parts, it would be impossible to determine on which of
them the general verdict rested. In such a manner the
ordinance could not be applied to the defendant. The case
was decided by a narrow margin. Mr. Justice Jackson, in
a strong dissent, declared: "Rioting is a substantive
evil . . . The evidence proves beyond dispute that danger
3f rioting and violence in response to this speech was
clear, present, and immediate." As the majority did not
rule on the merits, we have here a case where a statute
as construed was held to be an inhibition of free speech
in its application even though the facts of the case pre-
sumably :atisfied the "clear and present danger" test.
The technical correctness of the majority may be assumed.
This was a matter of statutory construction and of the
application of the construed provision to the case. Thus
this decision does not give a strong answer to our pre-
vious question. What would be the result if the position
taken here would be carried forward to a case in which a
statute were attacked on its face for possible unconsti-
tutional application in an obvious case of clear and pre-
sent danger? Such an application would create the anomaly
of a defendant going free, though guilty under an appli-
cable part of a statute and on the Constitutional test,
merely because of the possibility of another, unconsti-
tutional interpretation of the statute being applied in
a different case, even though the Constitutional question
could still be raised in such other case! Of course, the
contrary question then is, why should the Court not over-
rule a statute it finds unconstitutional whenever such a
statute is presented to it for justification of a convic-
tion? Perhaps a remedy can be found in a policy against
excessive technicality in applying a test of constitu-
tionality apart from the facts of the case.
However, it is not our purpose to suggest possible
future tendencies, but only to attempt an assessment of
the present standing of the doctrine. It is evident
that in the 30 years "clear and present danger" has been
the ostensible rule of the Court, and the 12 years it
has been the real rule, the Court has hardly been able
to agree on any of the issues it raises. Thus it is of
little use to make generalizations. As to what "circum-
stances" would justify inroads on freedom of speech, it
could be said that where the "substantive evil" is less
than the national safety or the existence of our form
of government, the Court is far less ready to uphold a
restriction on speech even when the danger of bringing
about such evil! is immenent. This is indicated in the
cases involving contempt of Court, labor disputes, and
religious liberty. There the freedom of speech, press,
and religion are held of much higher order than the in-
terests which interfere with them. Where a threat to
existence of the government itself is concerned, hardly
any cases since the period before the Lowry case have
dealt with what degree of peril the situation must pre-
sent to authorize restriction of speech. Thus whether
the attitude of the Court in the earlier decisions will
govern, or a modification thereof, is an open question.
Where the constitutionality of statutes per se is involv-
ed, the tendency of the Court is similar. It will look
to the importance of the interest protected, and the de-
gree of danger required will vary accordingly. It is
possible that in this phase the doctrine has been broad-
ened, as suggested in the Terminiello case, for when a
statute is cut down, any possible constitutional parts
often fall with the rest of it for want of severability.
Thus we see that the limits of the doctrine are
still in process of formulation. To date a summation
of the decisions have shown a tendency to set up a posi-
tive barrier against most encroachments on the liberties
protected by the First Amendment. But the issues are far
from being settled. As we must conclude by finding dis-
union, not only on the Court's application of the doc-
trine to facts, but also on a possible basic approach,
no clearer conception of this conflict can be conveyed
than by quoting the protagonists of these views. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in the Meadowmoor Dairies case:
"Freedom of speech . . . cannot be too often invoked as
basic to our scheme of society. But these liberties will
not be advanced or even maintained by denying to the
states with all their resources, including the instrumen-
tality of their courts, the power to deal with coercion
due to extensive violence." Mr. Justice Black in the
same case: "I view the guaranties of the First Amendment
as the foundation upon -which our governmental structure
rests, and without which it could not continue to endure
as conceived and planned . . . the states should be left
wholly free to govern within the ambit of their powers
. But this Court has long since committed itself to
the doctrine that a state cannot, through any agency,
either wholly remove or partially whittle away the
vital individual freedoms guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment.-" The divergent conclusions are indicated by the
.following quotations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the
Barnette case; "(Holmes did not enunciate) a formal
rule that there could be no restriction on free speech,
nor compulsion where conscience balks, unless imminent
danger would thereby be wrought to our institutions and
our Government." Mr. Justice Black in Bridges v. Calif-
ornia: "What emerges . . . is a working principle that
the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high, before utterances
can be punished. (The cases applying it do not) mark
the furthermost constitutional boundaries of protected
expression, nor do we here."
